Concerning the ubiquity of social media, this research tried to examine the impacts of using Telegram on Iranian EFL learners’ foreign language motivation, foreign language anxiety, and attitude toward learning. To achieve these purposes, 60 Iranian EFL learners at the intermediate level were selected and randomly divided into two groups: experimental and control. After that, both groups were pretested on motivation and anxiety variables. After pretesting, the participants in the experimental class received treatmentviausing the Telegram application, and the control students (...) were trained traditionally without using any social media. After an 18-session instruction, a post-test of motivation and a post-test of anxiety were given to both groups, and also an attitude questionnaire was distributed among the experimental group to inspect their attitudes toward the Telegram application in language learning. The results of using two one-way ANCOVA tests showed significant differences between the post-tests of the control and experimental groups in favor of the experimental group. The findings demonstrated that using the Telegram application increased the motivation of the experimental group and decreased their level of foreign language anxiety. Also, the results of one sample t-test showed that the participants of the experimental group held positive attitudes toward using the Telegram application in English language learning. The implications of this research can encourage both teachers and learners to use social media-based instruments in English teaching and learning. (shrink)

The neutrosophic cubic hesitant fuzzy set can efficiently handle the complex information in a decision-making problem because it combines the advantages of the neutrosophic cubic set and the hesitant fuzzy set. The algebraic operations based on Dombi norms and co-norms are more flexible than the usual algebraic operations as they involve an operational parameter. First, this paper establishes Dombi algebraic operational laws, score functions, and similarity measures in neutrosophic cubic hesitant fuzzy sets. Then, we proposed Dombi exponential operational laws in (...) which the exponents are neutrosophic cubic hesitant fuzzy values and bases are positive real numbers. To use neutrosophic cubic hesitant fuzzy sets in decision-making, we are developing Dombi exponential aggregation operators in the current study. In the end, we present applications of exponential aggregation operators in multiattribute decision-making problems. (shrink)

Die Reihe Islamkundliche Untersuchungen wurde 1969 im Klaus Schwarz Verlag begründet und hat sich zu einem der wichtigsten Publikationsorgane der Islamwissenschaft in Deutschland entwickelt. Die über 330 Bände widmen sich der Geschichte, Kultur und den Gesellschaften Nordafrikas, des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens sowie Zentral-, Süd- und Südost-Asiens.

The demand of many scientific areas for the usage of fractional partial differential equations to explain their real-world systems has been broadly identified. The solutions may portray dynamical behaviors of various particles such as chemicals and cells. The desire of obtaining approximate solutions to treat these equations aims to overcome the mathematical complexity of modeling the relevant phenomena in nature. This research proposes a promising approximate-analytical scheme that is an accurate technique for solving a variety of noninteger partial differential equations. (...) The proposed strategy is based on approximating the derivative of fractional-order and reducing the problem to the corresponding partial differential equation. Afterwards, the approximating PDE is solved by using a separation-variables technique. The method can be simply applied to nonhomogeneous problems and is proficient to diminish the span of computational cost as well as achieving an approximate-analytical solution that is in excellent concurrence with the exact solution of the original problem. In addition and to demonstrate the efficiency of the method, it compares with two finite difference methods including a nonstandard finite difference method and standard finite difference technique, which are popular in the literature for solving engineering problems. (shrink)

Tarekat teaches its followers not to glorify conglomerates, to keep their distance from leader, and to live in a way of zuhud, including in the matters of politics. But the Tarekat Qadiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah in Cukir Jombang was actually involved in practical politics as a supporter of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. This paper, which was written in the form of ethnographic design according to the concept of the power relations of Foucault to find new perspectives about the actions of Tarekat communities (...) in politics, in this case explaining the pattern of relations that occurred between the Tarekat Cukir and PPP and discovering the factors causing Tarekat Cukir to support PPP. This paper concludes that between Tarekat Cukir and PPP, there is a mutually beneficial pattern of relations in terms of proximity, but in terms of economic politics, the Tarekat Cukir feels disadvantaged. The dominant reason the Tarekat Cukir supports PPP is because of the dependence of Santri on their Mursyid who is a PPP politician. This is reinforced by the history between the two parties and the spiritual ties that connect the teachers who are both PPP politicians and Santris. (shrink)

A board of directors consists of a set of key personnel that hold vital positions in a company. Based on the premise of the resource dependence theory, we explore the association between board diversity and innovation performance in Malaysia. The sample consists of 220 companies from the industrial product sector of the main market of Bursa Malaysia for the financial year 2013. Board diversity is represented by a comprehensive score that includes age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, education, tenure, area of experience (...) and directorship in other companies. Results of the regression analysis show that there is a positive association between board diversity and innovation performance. Our findings contribute to the policy involving the diversity of corporate boards by suggesting that policy, such as one of gender diversity in Malaysia, is expanded to include multi-dimensional aspects of board diversity that better represent the economic, legal and cultural environment of a country. (shrink)

Sufi group mainly dictates its followers to distance themselves from worldy affairs and to live in religious seclusion. This article offers a distinct perspective on the study of sufism through examining the political activities of the sufi group the Tarekat Qa>diriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah of Cukir in Indonesia and the group’s political patron, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. The article benefits form a French philosopher Michel Foucault’s concept of geneology and the notion of knowledge to better comprehend the nature of political activism (...) of a sufi group. It further argues that basic concept of student and master relationship in Sufism is explaining the politics of sufism in contemporary Indonesia. The mutual relation between leaders of the sufi group and the PPP has facilitated the crossing boundaries of Sufi basic principle of non-participatory politics. (shrink)

We study the existence of weak solutions for the coupled system of functional integral equations of Urysohn-Stieltjes type in the reflexive Banach spaceE. As an application, the coupled system of Hammerstien-Stieltjes functional integral equations is also studied.

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

Unfounded—conspiracy and health—beliefs about COVID-19 have accompanied the pandemic worldwide. Here, we examined cross-nationally the structure and correlates of these beliefs with an 8-item scale, using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. We obtained a two-factor model of unfounded (conspiracy and health) beliefs with good internal structure (average CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04), but a high correlation between the two factors (average latent factor correlation = 0.57). This model was replicable across 50 countries (total N = 13,579), (...) as evidenced by metric invariance between countries (CFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMS = 0.07) as well as scalar invariance across genders (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03) and educational levels (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMS = 0.03). Also, lower levels of education, more fear of COVID-19, and more cynicism were weakly associated with stronger conspiracy and health beliefs. The study contributes to knowledge about the structure of unfounded beliefs, and reveals the potential relevance of affective (i.e., fear of COVID-19) and cognitive (i.e., cynicism) factors along with demographics, in endorsing such beliefs. In summary, we obtained cross-cultural evidence for the distinctiveness of unfounded conspiracy and health beliefs about COVID-19 in terms of their structure and correlates. (shrink)

Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Rabbi Eliyahu Touger, 18 vols.

This book examines the role of civilizations in the context of the existing and possible world orders from a cross-cultural perspective. Seeking to clarify the meaning of such complex and contested notions as "civilization," "order," and "world order," it takes into account political, economic, cultural, and philosophical dimensions of social life.

In this article, we consider estimation of the parameters of a generalized Pareto distribution and some lifetime indices such as those relating to reliability and hazard rate functions when the failure data are progressive first-failure censored. Both classical and Bayesian techniques are obtained. In the Bayesian framework, the point estimations of unknown parameters under both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions are discussed, after having been estimated using the conjugate gamma and discrete priors for the shape and scale parameters, respectively. In (...) addition, both exact and approximate confidence intervals as well as the exact confidence region for the estimators are constructed. A practical example using a simulated data set is analyzed. Finally, the performance of Bayes estimates is compared with that of maximum likelihood estimates through a Monte Carlo simulation study. (shrink)

According to the consencus of Muslim world, al-Aqsā Mosque is located in the land of al-Quds (Jerusalem). In this matter, especially the old Sunnite sources are in agreement with each other. However, there are recently some different views regarding the location of al-Aqsā Mosque. It has been argued that al-Aqsā Mosque most likley was built in a location differnet from Jerusalem. One of the defenders of this opinion is Muhammad Hamīdullah, who is a prominent scholar of Islamic studies and considered (...) to be a reliable authority among contemporary Islāmic historians. He claims that al-Aqsā Mosque, which was also mentioned in the Qur’ān, cannot be the Mosque that is present in Jerusalem. Rather, it must be searched in heavens. If this claim is accepted, then numerous reports informing that the mosque is located in Jerusalem and many interpretations based on these reports, will become problematic and controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to examine those claims and the relevant evidence in detail. Following this pueporse, we aim to examine and evaluate those views with a critical approach in this study. In this regard, we will argue that the comments and approaches that have been argued so far, are not consistent. Rather, relevant claims do not rely on strong evidence but only unsatisfactory interpretations. Summary: Muhammad Hamīdullah who is a prominent researcher and well-known for his studies on History of Islām, has individual opinions on some issues, different from classical scholars of Ahlu’s-Sunnah (branch of Islām that accepts the first four caliphs as rightful successors to Muhammad). One of his distinctive views is the original place of Masjid al-Aqsā (al-Aqsā Mosque). He claims that al-Aqsā Mosque was likely located, not in al-Quds (Jerusalem), but in heavens. In this article, our purpose is to examine this matter by evaluating his arguments regarding the place of al-Aqsā Mosque. Hamīdullah’s argument is based on several reasons which are as follows:Miʻrāc (The Ascension) is a journey from the earth to beyond the heavens. According to Hamīdullah, it is illogical to say that, in relation to such a magnificient occurrence, the Holy Qur’ān only mentions the journey from Mecca to Bayt al-Maqdis/al-Quds.Hamīdullah maintains that the expression “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā means “the remotest Mosque.” However, the Palestinian lands are described as “Adna’l-Arḍ/Nearest Country” in the third verse of Sūrah ar-Rūm. Thus, “the remotest Mosque” should not be “the nearest country”; rather it should be a Mosque in heavens.He also argues that in some Hadith texts, the mosque in question is mentioned as “Masjid al-Aqsā”, but there is a grammatical difference between the phrases of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” and “Masjid al-Aqsā”, which means that the mosque mentioned as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the Qur’ānic verse does not have a connection with al-Quds (Jerusalem). In his opinion, the expression of “Masjid al-Aqsā” which appears in some Hadith texts is in the form of a noun clause, while the quranic expression “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” is in the form of an adjective clause. Accordingly, “Masjid al-Aqsā” and “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” refer to different places. The noun clause -as in the Hadith texts- of “Masjid al-Aqsā” must be in al-Quds, whereas the Qur’ānic expression in the form of an adjective clause of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” must be a mosque in the heavens.According to his other claim, Abu’l-Yemān, the teacher of the teacher of Bukhārī, when narrating the hadith about mosques, he mentions this mosque, not as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”, but as Īliyā’. That is, according to him, early sources of hadith do not mention the phrase of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”, but instead, the phrase of Īliyā’ was used. Hamīdullah also states “... while narrating this hadith, Muslim does not use the phrases “Masjid al-Aqsā” or “al-Masjid al-Aqsā.” Instead, he uses the phrase Īliyā’.”He also states that the term al-masjid (the mosque) which appears in the seventh verse of Sūrah al-Isrā, was used to refer to that Īliyā’, not to refer to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. Likewise, the Umayyad Caliph Abdulmelik (26-86 h.c./646-705 g.c.) built the Dome of the Rock (Masjid al-Saḥra) in al-Quds and named it “Masjid al-Aqsā”. This name became so widespread at the times of Imam al-Bukhārī (194-256 h.c./810/870 g.c.) so that the old name Īliyā’ had been totally forgotten. Because of this reason, some hadith narrators were using this more common name “Masjid al-Aqsā” to express and describe this forgotten name.When we critically evaluate the information and approaches explained above, we come to the conclusion that they are not consistent. First of all, the claim that Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens, is in disagreement with the Qur’ānic verses implying that “Masjid al-Aqsā” is in al-Quds, and with many authentic hadith texts that indicate its existence on those lands. Also, the sources of Qur’ānic interpretations (exegeses) and historical narrations refute this claim. On the other hand, there is no Qur’ānic verse or tradition (hadith) that state that Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens.We argue that Hamīdullah’s claim “...It is illogical to say that, in relation to such a magnificient occurrence, the Holy Qur’ān only mentions the journey from Mecca to al-Aqsā Mosque in al-Quds” is not very appropriate. Because, it is beyond the human judgment to decide which part of this magnificient journey is more important or which part of it should take place in the Holy Qur’ān. Only Allah has the authority to decide for this. Moreover, we should remember that-as mentioned in the conveyed knowledge- the incident mentioned in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā is merely the magnificient journey from Mecca to Masjid al-Aqsā, which was clearly stated in the authentic hadith sources. As for the third verse of Sūrah al-Rūm, it is not correct to claim that Masjid al-Aqsā is not in al-Quds but in the heavens, by reading the text of the verse. Because, the phrase al-arḍ (the earth) has several meanings. Moreover, the phrase al-aqsā (the remotest) in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā, refers to distance between the two mosques, not between two countries.In some hadith texts, Masjid al-Aqsā was mentioned as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the form of a noun clause, but this does not require that the masjid in question should be in the heavens. Because, many hadith texts mention it in the form of an adjective clause. Besides, some hadith texts mention Masjid al-Harām (Great Mosque of Mecca) in the form of a noun clause (Masjid al-Harām), not in the form of an adjective clause (al-Masjid al-Harām). If we consider Hamīdullah’s claim, we should look for the Masjid al-Harām in the heavens, but not on earth. So far, neither he nor anybody else made such a claim.Hamīdullah argues that Abu’l Yemān mentioned this mosque as Īliyā’, but not as al-Masjid al-Aqsā, and claimed that early religious sources do not use the term al-Masjid al-Aqsā. However, this is not a sound argument. Because, the authorities of hadith and history, who lived both before Abu’l Yemān and also at the same era, used the term “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in their works and narrated that this term refers to al-Quds or Bayt al-Maqdis (Masjid al-Aqsā). Moreover, Hamīdullah’s claim that Muslim (a senior hadith scholar) did not use the terms “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” or “Masjid al-Aqsā” but instead he used the name “Īliyā’” is incorrect. Because, while narrating this hadith, the hadith scholar (Muslim) used all three names. As for the term “al-Masjid (the Mosque)” mentioned in Q 17.7, it is a groundless comment to claim that it does not refer to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in Q 17.1. Because the context of the verses and grammatical rules of Arabic language explicitly prove that the mosque mentioned in the seventh verse refers to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” which is also mentioned in the first verse.His claim that “the Umayyads named the temple that they built in Jerusalem as “Masjid al-Aqsā” and following the era of Umayyads, in the period of Bukhārī, this naming became widespread” is highly vulnerable and disputable. Because in those times, the temple used to be named as “al-Masjid al-Jami (the Gathering Mosque)”, not as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. Nearly three centuries after the Umayyads reign, the naming of the said temple was first introduced to be as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. As for the expression of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” appearing in the early sources of hadith, it was not used for the mosque built by the Umayyads, but was used to mean the entire haram (sacred, respected) region taking place in the south east corner of Jerusalem. In the light of arguments and explanations critically analysed above, we are in a position to argue that Muhammad Hamīdullah’s argument that “Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens”, does not rely on sound evidence, but rather, they are only some unsatisfactory interpretations. (shrink)

Traditional Chinese commentators rightly see that understanding Zhuangzi's way with words is the presupposition for understanding Zhuangzi at all. They are not sure, however, if Zhuangzi's words are super-effective or pure nonsense. I consider Zhuangzi's experience with language, and then turn to Heidegger's word of being to see if it may throw light on Zhuangzi's way of saying. I argue that a conversation between Heidegger and Zhuangzi on language is possible, but only by expanding Heidegger's notion of Gestell and through (...) a destruction of the dominant Confucian discourse that obscures Zhuangzi's way of saying. (shrink)

Biobanking is a relatively new concept in Egypt. Building a good relationship with different stakeholders is essential for the social sustainability of biobanks. To establish this relationship, it is necessary to assess the attitude of different groups towards this concept. The objective of this work is to assess the knowledge, attitude, and opinions of Egyptian patients towards biobanking issues. We designed a structured survey to be administered to patients coming to the outpatient clinics in 3 university hospitals in Egypt. The (...) survey included questions estimating the level of knowledge about the term “Biobank”, together with questions about the attitudes and opinions about related issues. Two hundred and fifty-nine patients participated in the survey. Eighty-one percent of participants reported that they never heard about the term before. About 85% expressed that they would be willing to donate their samples for research and about 87% thought that sample donation did not contradict their religious beliefs. Fifty eight percent were willing to participate in a genetic research project, 27.8% supported sharing their sample with pharmaceutical companies, and 32.4% agreed to share their samples with institutions abroad. Although there is limited knowledge about biobanking among Egyptian patients, many had a positive attitude towards sample donation and didn’t show religious concerns against it. However, they showed concerns regarding participation in genetic research and with sharing their samples across borders or with pharmaceutical companies. Public education about biobanking is possible, taking into consideration the specific cultural and legal framework in Egypt. (shrink)

I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...) the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?". (shrink)

In the present paper, we introduce new models of pendulum motions for two cases: the first model consists of a pendulum with mass M moving at the end of a string with a suspended point moving on an ellipse and the second one consists of a pendulum with mass M moving at the end of a spring with a suspended point on an ellipse. In both models, we use the Lagrangian functions for deriving the equations of motions. The derived equations (...) are reduced to a quasilinear system of the second order. We use a new mathematical technique named a large parameter method for solving both models’ systems. The analytical solutions are obtained in terms of the generalized coordinates. We use the numerical techniques represented by the fourth-order Runge–Kutta method to solve the autonomous system for both cases. The stabilities of the obtained solutions are studied using the phase diagram procedure. The obtained numerical solutions and analytical ones are compared to examine the accuracy of the mathematical and numerical techniques. The large parameter technique gives us the advantage to obtain the solutions at infinity in opposite with the famous Poincare’s method which was used by many outstanding scientists in the last two centuries. (shrink)

The quality of the products coming from different lines of production requires some tests called comparative life tests. For lines having the same facility, the lifetime of the product is distributed by Burr XII, the lifetime distribution, and units are tested under type-I generalized hybrid censoring scheme. The observed censoring data are used under maximum likelihood and the Bayes method to estimate the model parameters. The theoretical results are discussed and assessed through data analysis and Monte Carlo simulation study. Finally, (...) we reported some brief comments obtained from numerical computation. (shrink)

"My work has had nothing to do with gay liberation," Michel Foucault reportedly told an admirer in 1975. And indeed there is scarcely more than a passing mention of homosexuality in Foucault's scholarly writings. So why has Foucault, who died of AIDS in 1984, become a powerful source of both personal and political inspiration to an entire generation of gay activists? And why have his political philosophy and his personal life recently come under such withering, normalizing scrutiny by commentators as (...) diverse as Camille Paglia, Richard Mohr, Bruce Bawer, Roger Kimball, and biographer James Miller? David M. Halperin's Saint Foucault is an uncompromising and impassioned defense of the late French philosopher and historian as a galvanizing thinker whose career as a theorist and activist will continue to serve as a model for other gay intellectuals, activists, and scholars. A close reading of both Foucault and the increasing attacks on his life and work, it explains why straight liberals so often find in Foucault only counsels of despair on the subject of politics, whereas gay activists look to him not only for intellectual inspiration but also for a compelling example of political resistance. Halperin rescues Foucault from the endless nature-versus-nurture debate over the origins of homosexuality ("On this question I have absolutely nothing to say," Foucault himself once remarked) and argues that Foucault's decision to treat sexuality not as a biological or psychological drive but as an effect of discourse, as the product of modern systems of knowledge and power, represents a crucial political breakthrough for lesbians and gay men. Halperin explains how Foucault's radical vision of homosexuality as a strategic opportunity for self-transformation anticipated the new anti-assimilationist, anti-essentialist brand of sexual identity politics practiced by contemporary direct-action groups such as ACT UP. Halperin also offers the first synthetic account of Foucault's thinking about gay sex and the future of the lesbian and gay movement, as well as an up-to-the-minute summary of the most recent work in queer theory. "Where there is power, there is resistance," Michel Foucault wrote in The History of Sexuality, Volume I. Erudite, biting, and surprisingly moving, Saint Foucault represents Halperin's own resistance to what he views as the blatant and systematic misrepresentation of a crucial intellectual figure, a misrepresentation he sees as dramatic evidence of the continuing personal, professional, and scholarly vulnerability of all gay activists and intellectuals in the age of AIDS. (shrink)

According to James M. Kauffman, too much of what is said today about educational reform is nonsense that shortchanges students, parents, and taxpayers. This deforms education rather than reforming it. The primary objective of this book is to help teachers, teacher educators, policy makers, and parents think more critically about current rhetoric about education. Reason and science in the enlightenment tradition are more helpful in reforming and improving education than political agendas. Reform should focus on instruction. Education must address the (...) full range of learners, from those who are mentally retarded to those who are intellectually gifted. Special education, multicultural education, and standardized testing are among the controversial issues explored. Extremes of both left and right ideologies are rejected in favor of careful thinking and sound judgment. (shrink)

27-28 Mayıs 2016 tarihinde Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Tefsir Anabilim Dalı'nın organizasyonu ile yapılan XIII. Tefsir Akademisyenleri Koordinasyon Toplantısı ve Akademik Tefsir Çalışmaları Sempozyumu toplantısının tanıtım yazısı.

This paper attempts to analyze the performance of 57 memberstates of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation based on selectedindicators of some sectors namely demography, economics, educationand technology and innovation. Specifically, it aims at firstly portraying anoverview of OIC performance based on six selected indicators followed byanalyzing the relationship between selected development variables withliteracy and exploring the state of OIC performance as indicated by theirachievement based on selected indicators. The study was undertaken vis-àvisthe prevailing theories on modernization and development as well (...) as thewidely asserted underdevelopment of the contemporary Muslim ummah asclaimed by numerous contemporary Muslim scholars. The data were solicitedamong others from the World Bank Database, Statistical, Economic, and SocialResearch and Training, Centre of Islamic Countries of OIC andsome previous studies. They were then analyzed using SPSS with the resultsbeing generated mainly through the use of descriptive statistics. Among others,the study found that there is a positive correlation between Muslim countries’urban population growth and literacy rate, there is a steady decline in thenumber of OIC countries as they are categorized from lower to higher incomecategory placement and the percentage of the scientific publications of all 57OIC countries is far below that of any one single developed nation. (shrink)

Gordon Baker and I had been colleagues at St John’s for almost ten years when we resolved, in 1976, to undertake the task of writing a commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. We had been talking about Wittgenstein since 1969, and when we cooperated in writing a long critical notice on the Philosophical Grammar in 1975, we found that working together was mutually instructive, intellectually stimulating and great fun. We thought that we still had much to say about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and (...) it seemed to us that misinterpretations of passages in the Investigations were so extensive that it would be worth trying to write a detailed analytical commentary. It is difficult to recapture the excitement of those early days in being among the first to work on the microfilms and, subsequently, on the photocopies of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. We spent many hundreds of hours poring over the typescripts and the often only semi-legible manuscripts, fascinated and privileged to be able to try to follow the development of the thoughts of a great philosophical genius. We talked endlessly about what we had found in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts, and debated how it should be understood. The first fruit of our labours was Wittgenstein – Understanding and Meaning. Its guiding idea was to draw attention to the manner in which Wittgenstein linked the concepts of meaning, understanding and explanation, and so to bypass the connections between meaning, truth and truth-conditions that so fascinated philosophers of the 1970s, and to abandon the red-herring of assertion-conditions and anti-realism. After a hiatus of four years, during which time we wrote a controversial book entitled Frege – Logical Excavations and a polemical book on contemporary philosophy of language – Language, Sense. (shrink)

Given the tremendous burst of activity in the philosophy of science during the last quarter century, the number of books by trained philosophers dealing with the logic of biology is surprisingly small. Simon’s book resembles Morton Beckner’s The Biological Way of Thought in its comprehensive ambitions: "trying to discover what, if anything, is distinctive about biological science, its concepts, and its mode of explaining." The most obvious difference of the two books is Simon’s long central chapter on "Theories, Models, and (...) the Concept of the Gene," which deals with the history of genetics from Mendel’s predecessors to the successors of Watson and Crick. Beckner paid little explicit attention to the history of biology. Another difference lies in Beckner’s dogged assessment of all problems in the logic of biology from the perspective of what he called the Humean Pattern of Explanation—a detailed and difficult variant of the approach of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Nagel. Simon’s philosophical position is more flexible than Beckner’s. He provides an acceptable review of the literature of the last decade and a half; some of his conclusions are most interesting—even when incompletely supported by his arguments; and the utility of his book is insured by the fact that it is necessary to go back over twelve years to find another with which it can be compared. The first chapter contains a very effective critique of J. J. C. Smart’s thesis that biology is no more an autonomous science than is electrical engineering, but is merely applied physics and chemistry. Smart had argued from the grounds that all biological generalizations implicitly refer to terrestrial evolution and are not truly universal, and Simon demonstrates the general lack of success of all efforts to demonstrate a difference in kind between so-called laws of nature and empirical generalizations of the sort found in biology. The second chapter continues in this same vein, drawing an interesting contrast between phylogenetic explanation in biology and the explanation of individual events in human history, and claiming that ‘explanatory’ status may be granted to accounts which do not meet the requirements of the deductive-nomological model, as in the case of Darwin’s theories of the geographical distribution of plants and animals and the persistence of rudimentary organs. The author’s negative reaction to much of the recent philosophical literature concerning the role of functional analysis in biology seems particularly well placed. Following Hempel, most philosophers writing in the past ten years have regarded the occurrence of the item whose function is in question as the event to be explained. Simon correctly points out that in the biological literature, statements indicating the presence of this item are part of the explanans, usually one component in an explanation of the normal functioning of the organism. He also insists that functional or teleological statements cannot effectively be replaced by nonteleological ones. A functional account is one that relates an entity to the role it plays in an organized system. In the first of several serene non-sequiturs which mar the latter half of this book, Simon insists that the above account shows that the notion of function is essentially an "extrinsic" one and that teleological principles generally cannot be used to account for experience. No better argument than an appeal to Kant’s authority backs up this conclusion. The third chapter deals with the recent history of genetics; its summary makes the claim that "at no time during this history was it correct to say that one model was replaced by another one; rather, the development appears to have been one involving successive correction and refining of earlier conceptions. There has been no revolution: geneticists have always succeeded in either repelling or accommodating critical attacks on the model." The evidence presented earlier in the chapter confers some plausibility on this conclusion, but no more: Simon takes no notice of the controversy surrounding Kuhn and the notion of scientific revolutions, and provides no criteria by which to distinguish "revolutions" from "accommodations." The precise nature of the methodological continuity to be found in the history of genetics is crucial for the view that "biology, or at least genetics, must be regarded as incapable of yielding a complete explanation of the phenomena that come within its purview; if the ultimate principles appealed to are not those of chemistry and physics and hence essentially nonbiological, the explanation cannot be regarded as complete." The text does not clearly indicate the extent to which the author agrees with the statement just quoted; perhaps he only attributes it to "many biologists" impressed by the successes of molecular genetics. It is clear the Simon regards something he calls the "Cartesian attitude" as pervasive in biology. "Biologists are committed to attempting to explain the phenomena of life in terms of the nonliving... The property of being alive or being associated with a living system is simply not treated as a logical primitive within biological science." But this seems to take us back full circle—to the position of Smart, that biology is no more than applied physics and chemistry. Simon disagrees with Smart. How does he stand vis-a-vis this last statement of the Cartesian spirit he finds so pervasive in biology? I think he disagrees with it, but it is very hard to tell. Perhaps the answer is that the resolution of the issue of the autonomy of biology is a pragmatic matter, relative to a complex set of needs and commitments: the sorts of things that determine life styles, political attitudes, and religious points of view, as well as the growth of scientific understanding. The question of the precise configuration of Simon’s pragmatism remains very vague indeed—a consequence of his over use of the style of impersonal attribution rather than direct assertion. Simon says generally sane and familiar things about Biology and the Idea of Progress and about Biology and Ethics. The really startling assertion of the penultimate chapter, that "consciousness" is neither a biological nor a behavioral predicate, and that its foundations are essentially moral and legal, is unfortunately supported by no argument whatsoever. Instead, the reader is urged to examine two of the author’s previous articles.—E. M. (shrink)

The spectre of Descartes figured as a perpetual presence in much of twentieth century philosophy, but nearly always as an emblem for positions to be avoided. Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology, the ontological dualism of mind and body, the associated conception of the mind as a substance, and as a “thing that thinks” – all these have figured in recent philosophy as positions to be refuted or simply renounced, the absurda in one or another reductio argument. But for one prominent twentieth (...) century tradition the story is much more nuanced and complex. Twentieth century phenomenology, which began to stir as a well-defined movement in the last decade of the nineteenth century and has persisted in one form or another into the twenty-first, found in Descartes much more a causa belli than the usual bête noire. As a first approximation we can say that allegiance to Cartesianism divided the phenomenological tradition. Edmund Husserl, who along with Franz Brentano is usually acknowledged as the founder of the phenomenological movement, described Descartes as “the genuine patriarch of phenomenology”; he dubbed his own transcendental phenomenology as “a new, twentieth century Cartesianism”, and insisted that “the only fruitful renaissance is the one which reawakens [Descartes’] Meditations” (Husserl 1929/1964, 3, 5). But Husserl’s most important assistant, Martin Heidegger, rebelled against the Cartesian legacy in modern philosophy, which he saw as the central wrong-turn in modern thought, and as the chief obstacle to a faithful phenomenology and phenomenologically informed ontology. The cogito sum, Heidegger insisted, must be “phenomenologically destroyed” (Heidegger 1927/1962, 123). In Descartes himself Heidegger found “an extreme.. (shrink)

Each person should have their pride – a proper sense of their worth and dignity. Improper pride is arrogance; proper pride, one might say, is necessary for self‐respect. As an emotion, pride may take the form of a momentary emotional occurrence, as when, for example, one is complimented by people whose approval one appreciates on some achievement of one's own, of one's spouse, or of one's children. Pride may also take the form of a persistent, enduring, emotion, as when one (...) feels proud of one's beauty and figure, or of the good looks of one's spouse or children; of one's achievements; of some admirable possession one owns; of one's dog or horse; and of one's high rank and office. Christian theologians have taken certain forms of pride to be contraries, the former a deadly vice and the latter a virtue. Hume too took pride and humility to be contraries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 128-129 [Access article in PDF] Robert Crocker, editor. Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. xix + 228. Cloth, $77.00. By describing the early modern period as such, we thereby avow a continuity with it that ill squares with the following, insufficiently appreciated fact. The early modern counterparts of the largely atheistic American Philosophical Association, let's (...) say, were to an even greater degree theistic, and, moreover, theism affected their description and explanation of the world in a profound way—certainly more so than it does their few theistic descendents. This is true even of authors, like Hobbes and Spinoza, who might be read as leading to later atheism. The fact of early modern theism and its centrality in early modern philosophy and science are amply demonstrated in one after another of the eleven essays of this book.An emblematic figure is Robert Boyle, who figures as a main player in three of the essays, and is at least mentioned in five of the others. Lotte Mulligan, for example, investigates the role of "right reason" in Boyle's argument that religion is illuminated and made [End Page 128] plausible by metaphorically expressed analogies with natural philosophy, and conversely. The upshot is that only the "Christian Virtuoso," endowed with right reason whereby he is inspired to notice and express these analogies, was in a position to interpret the codes expressed both in the book of revelation and in the book of nature, one being incomplete without the other.Luisa Simonutti treats Boyle's engagement with the theological and scientific work of Spinoza through Spinoza's correspondence with Oldenburg. And G. A. J. Rogers deploys the work of Boyle, as well as of Locke, Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists, against the once-standard view (vide Butterfield) that "a major feature of the seventeenth-century was a secularization of knowledge." (Given just the other papers in this volume, this may seem like shooting fish in a barrel. Even so, perhaps one or two of the shots appear to miss. Newton seems proleptically to answer Hume's skepticism about induction by invoking, not divine simplicity, but an argument to the best explanation.)These papers overlap with two others, forming the core of the book. Sarah Hutton and Robert Crocker take on Cambridge Platonism. The former deals with Ralph Cudworth's rejection of Cartesian voluntarism in favor of an intellectualism of goodness and wisdom that grounds both the providential governance of the world and its intelligibility to human inquiry. The latter deals with Henry More's doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, a prima facie unlikely doctrine, but one that is less problematic, according to More, than the orthodox alternatives (creationism and traducianism).Three other papers fall outside this core, but their topics are no less relevant. Perhaps the most undeniable connection between the natural and the supernatural is to be found in Grotius, here studied by Jacqueline Lagree. Likely the most unexpected player will be the eccentric esprit fort, Cyrano de Bergerac. His work of nearly pure fantasy, in the Rabelaisian tradition, might well have made later, more serious heterodoxies possible. James E. Force provides a nice case study in Newton's reliance on what he took to be providentially guided comets as sources for the replenishment of otherwise declining celestial motion and matter (a line which, ironically, was picked up by Hume as a premise of an argument designed to undo the argument from design). Richard H. Popkin outlines three views of Judaism in the period. There is little connection with nature, but an important one with reason via a problem that exercised Cudworth and Newton: most peoples are polytheistic despite the clear monotheism of revelation. One theory had it that Judaism was the original, pure religion, which degenerated into various forms of paganism. But this degeneracy was soon read by the English deists such that originally there was a natural religion, of which Judaism and all others were a degeneration. Transmitted to the Enlightenment by Spinoza... (shrink)

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there to be (...) absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea. (shrink)

The topic of this book is a comparison between holism in the philosophy and language and social holism on the one hand and holism about space-time and quantum systems on the other hand. The main claim is that holism in the humanities and holism in fundamental physics come under the same substantial, general conception of holism. That is to say: arguments to the effect that the holism of the mental is unscientific or that the mental is separated from the physical (...) owing to holism are not sound. The holism of the mental fits into a world-view that bases itself on scientific realism. The addressees of this book are all those who care about our view of the world and ourselves in the spirit of an argumentative examination of different positions. No familiarity with physics is presupposed. (shrink)

We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled to you. On (...) Ayer’s view, in seeing the hen, you directly see a speckled sense-datum or appearance. Ryle wondered how many speckles there are on the sense-datum. After all, intu­ itively, the hen does not appear to you to have 47 speckles. And if this is the case, then it does not present to you an appearance with 47 speckles. Equally, however, the hen does not appear to you not to have 47 speckles. So, it does not present an appearance that lacks 47 speckles either. (shrink)

‘Thing’ in the titular question should be construed as having the utmost generality. In the relevant sense, a thing just is an entity, an existent, a being. The present task is to say what a thing of any category is. This task is, I believe, the primary one of any comprehensive and systematic metaphysics. Indeed, an answer provides the means for resolving perennial disputes concerning the integrity of the structure in reality—whether some of the relations among things are necessary merely (...) given those relata themselves—and the intricacy of this structure—whether some things are more or less fundamental than others. After considering some reasons for thinking the generality of the titular question makes it unanswerable, I propound the methodology, original inquiry, required to answer it. The key to this methodology is adopting a singular perspective; confronting the world as merely the impetus to inquiry, one can attain an account of what a thing must be. Radical ontology is a systematic metaphysics—broadly Aristotelian, essentialist and nonhierarchical—that develops the consequences of this account. With it, it is possible to move past stalemate in metaphysics by revealing the grounds of a principled choice between seemingly incommensurable worldviews. (shrink)

This is a close scrutiny of "De Anima II 5", led by two questions. First, what can be learned from so long and intricate a discussion about the neglected problem of how to read an Aristotelian chapter? Second, what can the chapter, properly read, teach us about some widely debated issues in Aristotle's theory of perception? I argue that it refutes two claims defended by Martha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Sorabji: (i) that when Aristotle speaks of the perceiver becoming (...) like the object perceived, the assimilation he has in mind is ordinary alteration of the type exemplified when fire heats the surrounding air, (ii) that this alteration stands to perceptual awareness as matter to form. Claim (i) is wrong because the assimilation that perceiving is is not ordinary alteration. Claim (ii) is wrong because the special type of alteration that perceiving is is not its underlying material realisation. Indeed, there is no mention in the text of any underlying material realisation for perceiving. The positive aim of II 5 is to introduce the distinction between first and second potentiality, each with their own type of actuality. In both cases the actuality is an alteration different from ordinary alteration. Perception exemplifies one of these new types of alteration, another is found in the acquisition of knowledge and in an embryo's first acquisition of the power of perception. The introduction of suitably refined meanings of 'alteration' allows Aristotle to explain perception and learning within the framework of his physics, which by definition is the study of things that change. He adapts his standard notion of alteration, familiar from "Physics" III 1-3 and "De Generatione et Corruptione" I, to the task of accounting for the cognitive accuracy of (proper object) perception and second potentiality knowledge: both are achievements of a natural, inborn receptivity to objective truth. Throughout the paper I pay special attention to issues of text and translation, and to Aristotle's cross-referencing, and I emphasise what the chapter does not say as well as what it does. In particular, the last section argues that the textual absence of any underlying material realisation for perceiving supports a view I have defended elsewhere, that Aristotelian perception involves no material processes, only standing material conditions. This absence is as telling as others noted earlier. Our reading must respect the spirit of the text as Aristotle wrote it. (shrink)

Although female and male gametes are presumably equivalent in their genetic contribution to embryos, they carry specific information, perhaps reversibly imprinted into the genomes during oogenesis and spermatogenesis, as to their maternal or paternal origin. This information is crucial for embryogenesis and, in the absence of at least one haploid set of chromosomes from each parent, embryos do not develop to term. The paternal genome is probably required for proliferation of extraembryonic tissues and the maternal genome for some stages of (...) embryogeneis. Furthermore, the effects of certain mutations are determined by the paternal or maternal origin of the inheritance. (shrink)

In ‘Naming and Necessity,’ Saul Kripke defends a number of essentialist claims. One of them is that having a certain origin is a necessary property of a material thing. Used in connection with a human being or, presumably, a living thing of another kind whose members sexually reproduce, ‘necessity of origin’ means that the organism must have been born of those individuals who are its parents, i.e., whose body tissues are sources of the sperm and egg from which it issued, (...) in the actual world. To say that the origin of an inanimate material thing is necessary is to say that having its origin in the hunk of matter from which it came is essential to it. (shrink)